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ABSTRACT
As per the agency theory, there is a conflict of interest between shareholders 
and managers. Shareholders are the principal and managers are the agents 
of a company. Both these parties have different objectives. So, these top 
executives who are hired to safeguard the interests of shareholders, after a 
period might start working for their own personal interests like, increase 
in the amount of their compensation and benefits, and, on the contrary, 
shareholders might wish to decrease operating expenses, salaries and aim 
for higher profits, or dividends. The objective of this study is to study 
the agency theory with reference to an insight to compensation for chief 
executives in Pakistan. It aims to find the effect of shareholder dividends, 
financial performance and firm size on executive compensation. The results 
show that market capitalization and return on assets are the major factors 
effecting executive compensation. However, interestingly, shareholder 
dividends do not show to have any effect on compensation.
Keywords: executive compensation, agency theory, firm performance, 
board independence, Pakistan.
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INTRODUCTION
After the relatively recent high profile fraud cases and scandals; like 
Adelphia, Enron, Harris Scarfe, HIH, Parmalat and WorldCom were revealed 
to this world; governance has become the focal point of research, calling for 
improved governance practices by businesses and many of them focusing 
on antecedents and consequences of executive compensation (Jensen & 
Murphy, 1990; Agrawal, Makhija & Gershon, 1991; Randøy & Nielsen, 
2002). One of the major concepts underlying the corporate governance 
system is that of agency costs. Thus, in order to see the corporate governance 
system, deliver its desired results, it is vital to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of executives and structure the executive’s pay efficiently. This 
component has come into a lot of discussion and criticism from different 
stakeholders of the company, questioning any link between the amount being 
paid to the top executives and the resulting performance of the company. 
One of the important functions of the board is to reduce agency cost. Thus, 
the board can use the tool of designing executive compensation in such a 
way as to reduce the conflict of interest among managers and owners (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983).
Inspite of the above, much research is yet to be done in developing 
economies; as in these economies the businesses have different dynamics. 
They are usually closely owned and controlled by families and these 
founders of the businesses often try to intervene in business matters. 
According to Lodhi (2017), in Pakistan the rate of taxation has a significantly 
negative relationship with domestic investment. Also according to nishat, 
Shaheen and Hijazi (2004), there are many issues which are confronting 
Pakistan’s corporate sector. These include: functioning of directors with 
respect to owners, labor laws and productivity of companies’ relationship, 
dispensation of executives, role of shareholders and the non-availability of 
accountable reporting frameworks.
The Companies’ Ordinance of Pakistan (1984), defines the chief 
executive as an individual who acts as per the directions of directors, is 
entrusted with complete or substantially complete powers of managing 
the affairs of the business. It also includes any director occupying the 
position of CEO by whatever the given position name is. Agency cost can 
be reduced, by effective planning and striking the right balance, lessening 
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the conflict of interest i.e. the increase in chief executive’s (agent’s) salary 
should not be at the cost of the dividends of shareholders (principal), and 
vice versa. This study will address the gap, by finding empirical evidence 
regarding the effect, if any, of shareholder dividends on chief executive’s 
compensation. Further, it will also determine the effect of a company’s 
financial performance and firm size on CEO compensation.
This paper follows the following pattern: Section - 2 presents the 
review of relevant literature, Section - 3 shows the methodology used, 
Section - 4 gives the findings of the study and Section - 5 gives the conclusion 
for this paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW
According to Berle and Means (1932) separation of ownership and control is 
the root cause of all agency problems. Agency relationship is like a contract 
in which a principal engages to perform the operations of the company 
on his behalf. This also means delegation. So, the powers of some of the 
decisions will have to be now shared with the agents of the company. If 
both the parties wish to try to maximize their utilities, then an agent will 
not be always working in the principal’s best interest.
The study of Bebchuk and Fried (2003), discussed that financial 
economists view executive compensation arrangements as a (partial) 
remedy to the agency problem. Under this view, the board of directors need 
to design remuneration schemes, usually known as “optimal contracting 
approach”, to provide incentives to the executives to maximize shareholder 
value. Murphy (1999); Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) are the 
recent of these financial economists’ work. There are reasons to believe 
that CEO compensation can be fruitfully examined not only as a problem 
arising from divorce of ownership and control but as a part and parcel of 
the problem itself (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). Furthermore, Iqbal (2016) 
suggests that the number of board members sitting on the board i.e. the size 
of the board and their experience also impacts the financial performance of 
pharma companies in Pakistan. According to Agarwal (1981), firm size is 
an important factor for determination of executive compensation, however 
the previous researchers were not able to clearly specify what exactly the 
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interpretation of this relationship is variable firm size has also been used 
by Chalmers, Koh and Stapledon, (2006).
The study of Masson (1971) showed that performance of companies 
is better if the CEO’s returns are aligned with the shareholder’s interest. 
However, they did not see any relationship between CEO compensation 
and net sales of the company. According to Yermack (1995) out of the nine 
compensation theories, seven do not have much data backing, furthermore, 
contingent pay instruments are not well designed to reduce agency costs. 
On the contrary to this, Kato and Kubo (2003) in their research done in 
the Japanese region using panel data from the period 1986-1995, found 
that executive compensation is associated with firm performance but 
there is a weak relationship between executive compensation and market 
performance. 
Mehran (1995) concluded that firms with more outside directors 
have a positive relationship with CEO compensation. The data was taken 
from 1979-80 by random selection of one hundred and fifty-three U.S 
companies. According to Agrawal, Makhija, and Mandelker, (1991) the 
level and structure of compensation is fundamentally different for utility 
firms. According to the study of Ballout (1992), there exists a positive 
relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance. Strategic 
initiatives such as research and development intensity were reported to 
have direct positive influences on CEO compensation. Similarly, a broad 
ranging study was performed by McKnight and Tomkins (1999), examining 
the data of companies from 1991 – 1995 of company’s performance. The 
results suggested that there is a positive yet weak relationship between 
the salary of the CEO and the performance of companies. The study by 
Anderson and Bizjak (2003) suggested that the board committees having 
insiders do not make much difference in increasing / decreasing the overall 
pay or incentives. 
According to Attaway (2000), who conducted his study on the 
electronics and computer industry, found that there is a direct relationship 
between the performance of the company. Similarly, Merhebi, Pattenden, 
Swan and Zhou (2006) studied data from 1990 – 1999 and found a significant 
and positive relationship between CEO’s compensation and company 
performance. 
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However, according to Lone, Hasan and Afzal (2015) who conducted 
their research on the Banking sector of Pakistan, which is one of the sectors 
paying very high salaries and benefits to their executives. A panel data of 22 
banking firms for the years 2006 – 2013 was analyzed, which showed that 
size of the firm. It was found that if the assets increase, the compensation 
also goes up by a small percentage. However, on the other hand, return 
on equity which was used as a variable for measuring performance of the 
firm has a negative yet insignificant impact on the compensation of CEOs. 
Moreover, the study by Iqbal (2016) resulted that duality of position of 
the CEO negatively impacts the performance of the companies in the 
Pharmaceutical industry.
METHODOLOGY
Data Collection
For the purpose of this study, secondary data was extracted from annual 
financial statements of the companies. This was done from the company’s 
official websites and the website of the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX). 
Apart from this, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan 
(SECP) website was also referred to for the updated code of corporate 
governance for the listed companies in Pakistan.
Sample
The companies listed on the PSX – 100 (Pakistan stock exchange), was 
the population for this research study. The banking, insurance and financial 
institutions sector was excluded for the purposes of sample selection, as this 
sector has different characteristics than the other sectors. The total number 
of observations were extracted from 66 companies. Data from 2010- 2015 
was collected for this research.
Regression Model
The following model was considered for the purpose of this study, 
considering executive compensation, dividends, firm performance and 
corporate governance variables. One year lag was used, as according to 
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the previous researchers like Randøy and Nielsen (2002) compensation 
decisions of the current year are made on the basis of last year’s structure 
and performance. Similar models were also found in the literature used by 
Randøy and Nielsen (2002); Core et al., (1999); Mikko Mäkinen (2008).
Ln(CEO comp)t = a+ b1 ln(Market Cap)t-1 + b2 ln(DPS)t-1 + b3 ln(ROA)
t-1 + b4 ln(FS)t-1 + εit
Where:
CEO comp = Chief Executive Officer’s Compensation
Market Cap = Market Capitalization
DPS = Dividend per share
ROA = Return on Assets
FS = Total Assets
Dependent and Independent Variables and their definition:
 Chief Executive Compensation = natural log of the total compensation 
of CEO
 Market Capitalization = no. of outstanding shares x Closing share 
price
 DPS (Dividend per share) = Log of (Dividends / No. of ordinary 
shares)
 ROA (Return on Assets) = Log of (Net Profit after tax / Total Assets)
 Size of the firm = Log of Total assets (Control var.)
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
The Table - 1 below shows the descriptive statistics of the research 
results. The dependent variable used in this study i.e. total CEO 
compensation mean value is shown to be Rs. 27,146,247 whereas, the 
median compensation reports at Rs. 18,398,000. It is interesting to note that 
the maximum compensation paid to CEO is reported to be Rs. 238,812,000 
which is around 8.75 times higher than the mean compensation.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
TOTAL_CEO_
COMPENSATION DPS ROA
LNTOTAL_
MARKET_CAP LNTASSETS
 Mean 27146247 11.24080 0.096965 23.20725 23.72726
 Median 18398000 4.000000 0.089475 23.57291 23.88175
 Maximum 238812000 190.0000 0.633480 27.74769 27.04005
 Minimum 0.000000 0.000000 -1.507220 14.51305 15.36986
 Std. Dev. 33034444 24.31469 0.137451 2.315801 1.510357
The independent variable dividend per share mean value shows to be 
11.24 with a median of 4.00 and a maximum of 190. The mean value of 
return on equity (ROA), had a mean value of 9.60% with a median ROA 
reported at 8.90%. Some companies also reported a loss which was shown 
in the minimum value of the descriptive at a low of -1.50%, however, the 
maximum ROA was reported to be as high as 63% by the companies.
Correlation Analysis
Table – 2 below shows the correlation among different variables. 
It shows that CEO compensation has a positive correlation with all the 
variables, except for the log of total assets. Similarly, market capitalization 
has a positive relationship with all the other variables in the model. 
Dividends per share has a positive correlation noticeably of 0.29 with market 
capitalization and 0.27 with ROA. The log of total assets have a correlation 
of 0.49 with market capitalization.
Table 2: Correlation 
LNTOTAL_
CEO_COMP
LNTOTAL_
MARKET_CAP LNDPS LNROA LNTASSETS
LNTOTAL_CEO_
COMP 1.000000 0.188926 0.031322 0.108346 -0.010247
LNTOTAL_
MARKET_CAP 0.188926 1.000000 0.290496 0.205027 0.495807
LNDPS 0.031322 0.290496 1.000000 0.276887 0.088369
LNROA 0.108346 0.205027 0.276887 1.000000 0.053797
LNTASSETS -0.010247 0.495807 0.088369 0.053797 1.000000
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Regression Analysis
Table 3, shows the results of Fixed Effects specification. The results of 
regression show that the R2 is 88% and adjusted R2 is 84% which shows the 
explanatory power of the model. It means that the model explains 84% of 
the variance in CEO compensation and the remaining 16% is unexplained by 
the model. The F-statistic has a significant value of 19.94, with a significant 
p-value which is less than 5%. The Durbin-Watson value is 1.74, which is 
well in the relevant range. 
The regression results show that market capitalization has a negative 
but significant impact on CEO compensation, with a p – value of 0.0149. 
Further, ROA has a positive and significant impact have p-value of 0.089. 
However, the dividends and firm size do not show a statistically significant 
impact on CEO compensation.
Table 3: Applying Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable: LNTOTAL_CEO_COMP
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 18.42701 0.866506 21.26587 0.0000
LNTOTAL_MARKET_CAP(-1) -0.064854 0.026347 -2.461537 0.0149
LNDPS(-1) 0.025661 0.047959 0.535051 0.5934
LNROA(-1) 0.073029 0.042753 1.708154 0.0895
LNTASSETS(-1) 0.001793 0.036843 0.048658 0.9613
R-squared 0.887986
Adjusted R-squared 0.843458
F-statistic 19.94244
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Durbin-Watson stat 1.749832
Further, the Random effects model was applied on the panel data.
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Table 4: Random Effects
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 18.16223 0.832808 21.80842 0.0000
LNTOTAL_MARKET_CAP(-1) -0.041263 0.025232 -1.635313 0.1034
LNDPS(-1) 0.008132 0.045440 0.178963 0.8581
LNROA(-1) 0.076005 0.039545 1.921994 0.0559
LNTASSETS(-1) -0.008976 0.035246 -0.254680 0.7992
The Hausman Test was applied, to check whether the fixed effect model 
is preferable or Random effects. The results of the Hausman Test is given in 
Table – 5 below, and shows that the probability value is significant, having 
a p-value of 0.0176, which is less than 0.05; the null hypothesis of using the 
random effects is rejected. Thus, it can be said that the fixed effects model 
is appropriate here for conducting this research 
Table 5: Applying Hausman Test
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.
Cross-section random 11.970993 4 0.0176
The probability value is less than 5% so the null hypothesis is rejected. 
This confirms that using the Fixed Effects model is appropriate for this 
research.
Table 6: Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
Dependent Variable: LNTOTAL_CEO_COMP
Method: Panel Generalized Method of Moments
R-squared 0.801957
Adjusted R-squared 0.695934
Durbin-Watson stat 2.352196
Instrument rank 55
J-statistic 1.743628
The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation technique 
was formalized by Professor Hansen (1982) and it has become one of the 
widely used methods of estimation for models. Its usage has a lot to offer, 
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as it reduces the possible problems of endogenity, autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity in the data. GMM is efficiently applied when the data has 
more cross sections and relatively lesser number of time periods i.e. when 
T < N. As in our case, we can efficiently use the GMM.  Table 5, shows 
the results of GMM estimation. These results show that the R2 is 80.94%. 
Interestingly, this value supports and is near to the R2 of the previously 
calculated value shown in the results of fixed effects. It shows that the model 
explains around 80% of the variance in CEO compensation, which shows a 
good explanatory power of the model. The J-statistic value is a part of the 
GMM results. The results show the J-stats value of 1.74 showing that the 
model is fit. Now, the p-value is calculated. Here the null hypothesis is that 
the model is properly specified i.e. instruments are valid. The results show 
that the Scalar p-value is 1.000, which is quite higher than 0.05, so we fail 
to reject the null hypothesis. Thus, it means that the instruments used are 
valid and the model is fit.
CONCLUSION
This research examined CEO compensation in Pakistan. It aimed to find 
the effect of shareholder dividends, financial performance and firm size 
on CEO compensation. The results conclude that in our country there is 
no significant effect of shareholder dividends on executive compensation. 
Further, there is a very weak correlation between them. It means that an 
increase in CEO compensation does not bring any change in the dividends 
of shareholders (owners). So, it can be said that during a bad performance 
year, a decrease in dividends to shareholders, will not necessarily affect the 
CEO and probably will not lead to a decrease in the compensation of the 
CEO. However, the results show that performance of the firm (ROA) does 
affect the compensation of CEO’s in Pakistan. This means that if the ROA 
increases, it will also lead to an increase in CEO compensation in Pakistan.
In short, the research results show that market capitalization and ROA 
does affect the CEO, whereas, firm size and shareholder dividends do not 
show to have an influence on the compensation of the CEO. Research in 
future could be done by increasing the number of years, by trying to get data 
of more companies as well. Also, similar research could also be conducted 
in other Asian regions.
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